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Neurophenomenology is a research programme aimed at bridging the explanatory gap
between first-person subjective experience and neurophysiological third-person data,
through an embodied and enactive approach to the biology of consciousness. The present
proposal attempts to further characterize the bodily basis of the mind by adopting a
naturalistic view of the phenomenological concept of intentionality as the a priori invariant
character of any lived experience. Building on the Kantian definition of transcendentality as
“what concerns the a priori formal structures of the subject’s mind” and as a precondition
for the very possibility of human knowledge, we will suggest that this transcendental
core may in fact be rooted in biology and can be examined within an extension of the
theory of autopoiesis. The argument will be first clarified by examining its application
to previously proposed elementary autopoietic models, to the bacterium, and to the
immune system; it will be then further substantiated and illustrated by examining the
mirror-neuron system and the default mode network as biological instances exemplifying
the enactive nature of knowledge, and by discussing the phenomenological aspects of
selected neurological conditions (neglect, schizophrenia). In this context, the free-energy
principle proposed recently by Karl Friston will be briefly introduced as a rigorous,
neurally-plausible framework that seems to accomodate optimally these ideas. While
our approach is biologically-inspired, we will maintain that lived first-person experience
is still critical for a better understanding of brain function, based on our argument that
the former and the latter share the same transcendental structure. Finally, the role that
disciplined contemplative practices can play to this aim, and an interpretation of the
cognitive processes taking place during meditation under this perspective, will be also
discussed.
Keywords: neurophenomenology, Kant, a priori, prereflective awareness, default mode network, ongoing activity,
free-energy, meditation
INTRODUCTION
Neurophenomenology, a programmatic endeavour to integrate
the basic principles of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology with
the findings of cognitive neuroscience, was originally proposed
within the theoretical framework of autopoiesis and enactive
cognition (Maturana and Varela, 1980; Varela et al., 1991) as
“a methodological remedy for the hard problem” (Varela, 1996).
While its aim of bridging the explanatory gap between first-
person witnessing of life and third-person scientific accounts of
experience has yet to be fulfilled, there is currently a renewed
interest not only in better defining the theoretical project itself,
but also in identifying a pragmatic implementation of the neu-
rophenomenological method (Lutz, 2002; Lutz et al., 2002; Lutz
and Thompson, 2003; Cosmelli et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007).
Within the dialectic field spanned by the first- and third-
person epistemological poles, many phenomenology-oriented
authors have recently argued for at least a methodological, if
not an ontological primacy of consciousness over its neurosci-
entific correlates (Wallace, 2000; Bitbol, 2008). Bitbol (2008),
in particular, uses a number of arguments from epistemology,
phenomenology, neuropsychology, and physics to demonstrate
the inconsistency of a reductionist approach to consciousness,
where mental states are ontologically dependent on physical
states; neurophenomenology is then viewed as a novel scien-
tific method building on a corpus of intersubjectively-invariant
first-person reports that may broaden the horizon of objective
science.
In this paper, we would like to take a closer look at and build
on one of the key features of the enactive approach, namely the
natural roots of intentionality, a phenomenological notion indi-
cating that experience is always “about something” (Thompson,
2007, p. 27, pp. 157–162). To this aim, we will argue that for
the environment to become meaningful for an organism, the lat-
ter must be endowed with a hierarchical set of a priori (albeit
malleable) structures that somehow mirror selected aspects of
it—in line with Kant’s notion of transcendental. Since the tran-
scendental is also at the very basis of phenomenology, we hope
that underscoring its embodied roots can provide a useful inspi-
ration for future interdisciplinary research into the mind-brain
problem.
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This article is structured as follows. After introducing the
philosophical background to our thesis (Section 1), we will dis-
cuss a naturalized account of intentionality, whereby the tran-
scendental is interpreted as the defining character of autopoietic
agents (Section 2); the bacterium and the immune system will be
used as elementary examples of embodied transcendentality. In
Section 3, we will propose that the activity of selected neural net-
works in the human brain can be interpreted as displaying the
functionality of the transcendental structure at multiple levels,
suggesting potential implications for clinical conditions; the free-
energy principle proposed by Karl Friston (Friston and Stephan,
2007) will be introduced as a neurobiologically-plausible the-
oretical framework that seems particularly fitting for the ideas
presented here. We will conclude (Section 4) with some con-
siderations on the role that contemplative practices may play in
neurophenomenology. Figure 1 illustrates synoptically the rela-
tionships among the themes discussed in the present paper.
1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL IN PHILOSOPHY
We will begin by introducing a few fundamental concepts from
Husserl’s philosophy (Husserl, 1960, 1970), with an emphasis
on their Kantian roots, in order to characterize the role of the
transcendental in our own proposal.
Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology
Husserl refuses to accept what he calls “the natural attitude,”
the naive and non-reflexive everyday consciousness of the world
leading to the common belief that reality as it appears exists in
itself, that is, has an ontological value. Husserl’s operation, called
epoché, consists in the attempt of “bracketing out” unexamined
preconceptions from statements about reality (including those
on which natural science relies), and finds the manifestation of
consciousness itself as the only residual of this rigorous examina-
tion. This gnoseological praxis led Husserl to the characterization
of subjectivity as transcendental, a term denoting the a priori 1
determination of the form and quality of experience. According
to Husserl, the fundamental character of experience does not
consist in its phenomenal content, but rather in the pre-given
“horizon” (a term with a deliberate connotation of “illusory” or
“apparent”) that is the condition for the perception of each object
1In philosophy, the notions of a priori and a posteriori assume the sensory,
empirical experience as the reference point. For instance, the formal state-
ments of logic are considered generally a priori, because they do not need
validation from, or are somewhat independent of sensory experience; on the
other hand, a specific aroma is generally considered an a posteriori object as it
relies completely on sensory experience.
FIGURE 1 | A schematic depiction of the articulation of the main themes
of the article. The brain pictures are toy-representations of the default mode
network (red stars) and the putative human analog of the mirror-neuron
circuit (green stars). On the lower left of the figure, a flagellated bacterium is
moving toward an area of high sucrose concentration. In the middle,
Y-shaped immunoglobulines are poised to recognize a viral epitope.
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or phenomenon: this background primary consciousness is what
enables the transcendentally-constructed world.
Intentionality and Prereflective Awareness
We will use the term “intentionality” here to indicate the mind’s
innate tension toward its object, a definition underscoring the
relationship between act and content of experience. Mental acts
or processes (e.g., focusing one’s attention, recalling memories,
experiencing surprise to unexpected events, etc.) are referred to
by Husserl as noesis; mental contents, such as objects of percep-
tion, thought, memory, imagery, emotion and so on, are called
noema. In order to understand the forthcoming sections, it is
useful to see noesis as an a priori dimension of experience, and
noema as an a posteriori, although such distinction may not cor-
respond exactly to Husserl’s original position. Moreover—since
to see an object is indissolubly tied to the subjective experience of
seeing, to recall a memory cannot be separated from the subjec-
tive quality of recalling, and so on—intentionality is coessential
with prereflective self-awareness (Lutz and Thompson, 2003), the
self-manifesting awareness of experience that does not require a
voluntary act of introspection or reflection (Depraz et al., 2000;
Zahavi, 2003). Prereflective self-awareness is considered by a long
philosophical tradition as the very mode of experience (“any con-
scious existence exists qua conscious of existing,” Sartre, 1943;
Zahavi, 2003), and there has been recently a keen interest in the
search for its bodily roots (Wider, 1997; Zahavi, 2002). Notably,
prereflective self-awareness can be seen as the most basic form of
noesis, i.e., the fundamental a priori form within whose limits all
experience arises. It is in this sense that we can view intentionality
as a manifestation of the transcendental: to use a metaphor, it can
be likened to the founding act of the fisherman casting his net out
into the sea to begin his catch; without this initial lighting up of
consciousness, which embeds an essential predictive component,
nothing could be perceived at all.
It is important to distinguish this notion of intentionality from
its functionalist-cognitivist acceptation (Fodor, 1975), the latter
indicating the semantic link between a mental representation and
its object in the external world that often assumes a one-to-one
mapping. Concerning the validity of this assumption, it is use-
ful to briefly recall here Freeman and Skarda (1990)’s argument
about the widespread use of the notion of representation in cogni-
tive science. In a cogent critique, the authors point to a consistent
body of experimental evidence that the search for specific EEG
patterns coding for different olfactory stimuli had been mislead-
ing: odor-specific neural activity in the olfactory bulb is in fact
more influenced by the ongoing neural, behavioral, and envi-
ronmental context than by the sheer physical characteristics of
the external stimuli (Freeman and Skarda, 1985), a finding that
is difficult to reconcile with a purely representationalist view of
cognition.
The a priori Determination of Knowledge: Kant’s Legacy
Before delving further into the matter, we would like to con-
sider briefly the Kantian legacy in phenomenology. Kant aimed
at providing a theoretical justification for the objectiveness of the
newborn Galileian-Newtonian physics. The 18th century debate
about the legitimacy of a mathematical formalization of nature,
i.e., about whether nature could conform to a merely-human
logic, led the skeptic philosophers (Hume, Berkeley) to claim
that the only value that can be attributed to science is practical
and nothing can be stated about its connection with reality. In
order to overcome such impasse, Kant proposed a revolutionary
(albeit influenced by Aristotle) reconceptualization of the process
of human knowledge, which he illustrated in his Critique of Pure
Reason.
Kant begins by examining perceptions (called “sensory intu-
itions”) as the result of the encounter between the external world
and the subject’s senses, where every perception is necessarily
framed within a specific space and time. However, the cate-
gories of space and time are now considered neither absolute
and objective, i.e., existing in the world (as Newton held), nor
totally subjective and existentially private (as Leibnitz claimed).
Space and time are for the first time defined as “transcenden-
tal,” that is, formal and empty a priori structures of the subject.
The external world can be sensorily perceived only inasmuch as it
“fits” such predetermined forms. The thus obtained sensory intu-
ition is then passed onto a higher level of cognitive elaboration
where a different and more abstract set of categories (includ-
ing quantity, quality, reciprocity, cause-effect, etc.) mediates the
production of scientific claims—propositions that are by defini-
tion true both per se and intersubjectively. But how can the link
between these intellectual categories and the outer world—and
therefore the objectivity of science—be guaranteed? Intellectual
categories must be transcendental forms as well, which thanks to
a direct connection to the empirical senses via the basic space and
time categories, can predetermine the kind of external material
that can be sensorily perceived. To put it succintly, we can only
perceive what we can elaborate into concepts.
The Critique of Pure Reason indeed overturns the relationship
between knowing subject and experienced object, arguing that
the properties that we can assign to the object are nothing but
the very preconditions for knowing the object itself: we do not
know the object per se, and our world is populated by objects
only inasmuch as they fit our predetermined sensory and intel-
lective apparatus 2. It is not difficult to extend such notion to
living beings in general, within the perspective of enactive cogni-
tion: each organism brings forth a predetermined (but malleable)
structure to face the world, thus creating its own umwelt or “inner
world” (Uexkull, 2010). To use a common illustration, a bac-
terium sensible to three chemicals (e.g., sucrose, lactose and an
isomer of lactose) lives in a world whose cardinal features consist
only of these three objects fitting the bacterium’s predetermined
sensory apparatus (receptors and metabolic networks): the rest
2In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
writes: “If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not
see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the
object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily
conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now, as I cannot rest
in the mere intuitions, but if they are to become cognitions [. . .], here again
there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume that the concep-
tions [. . .] conform to the object—and in this case I am reduced to the same
perplexity as before; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is
the same thing, that experience [. . .] conform to my conceptions—and then I
am at no loss how to proceed.” (Kant, 1990).
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of the physicochemical world for the bacterium is the “the object
per se,” i.e., Kant’s noumenon, which is utterly opaque to cogni-
tion. From such a point of view, the transcendental can in fact be
appreciated as the very mode of both subjectivity and life.
2. EMBODYING THE TRANSCENDENTAL
A number of different nuances about the notion of autopoiesis
were highlighted already in Varela et al. (1974); Maturana and
Varela (1980). A simple yet precise definition, taken from Varela’s
later writings and adopted by Thompson (2007) as a cornerstone
for his argument, is that a system can be considered autopoietic
if 1) it consists of a network of chemical reactions which regener-
ate at least some of the components of the system, 2) the system
has a semipermeable boundary, and 3) this boundary is the result
of reactions taking place necessarily within the boundary. The
term “operational closure” is used in Varela et al. (1991) to indi-
cate the intrinsically recursive nature of the reactions the system
consists of. Since such a system is immersed in the environment
it generated from and continually exchanges energy and matter
with it, the identity singled out by the autocatalytic production3
of the system’s membrane is far from representing a disconnec-
tion from the external world. Indeed, its identity emerges from
bringing forth selected relations with the environment, such as
the intake of external chemicals that will take part in the sys-
tem’s reactions: these chemicals become nutrients, acquiring that
“surplus of significance” that points to the difference between
external environment and world under the organism’s perspec-
tive (Varela et al., 1991; Varela, 1997). Operational closure and
the environment-linked thermodynamic openness of autopoi-
etic systems can be described as a continuous change within a
struggle for the re-affirmation of an invariant form. Such relation-
ship between autopoietic agents and the environment (enaction)
is what characterizes, in Varela and Maturana’s view, the mini-
mal form of cognition, as synthesized by the formula “living is
sense-making” (Varela et al., 1991).
Our contribution to this view focuses on the examination of
what enables the organism to make sense of the environment
(however unconsciously). We propose that an embodied ana-
log of Kant’s a priori structures may be at work. This change of
accent, within the same perspective, is based on an extension of
the notion of the Kantian transcendental consisting in rooting
an a priori formal structure at the biological level. We acknowl-
edge here a strong affinity with Thompson (2004), who links
intentionality as a self-organizing openness to the world with
biology, arguing that autopoiesis is “the minimal form this type
of self-organization can take” (Thompson, 2007, pp. 157–165).
This sentence contains indeed, in a nutshell, a formulation of
an embodiment of the transcendental similar to ours, with an
explicit reference to dynamic systems theory (Thompson, 2007, p.
27). However, Thompson’s claim that experience is “irreducible”
due to its “ineliminable transcendental character”(Thompson,
2004) seems to favor a usage of the transcendental in a purely-
phenomenological way: the transcendental is our own lived expe-
rience, which alone renders an epistemology of living organisms
3A chemical reaction is said to be autocatalytic if at least one of the reaction’s
products is a catalyst for the reaction itself.
possible (Thompson, 2007, pp. 162–165). Our analysis of the
autopoietic analogs of Kantian categories, on the other hand,
aspires to trace the “ineliminable transcendental character” of
phenomenology within biology (and the brain) itself. In order
to clarify this important point, we discuss briefly some relevant
issues highlighted by Thompson (2007).
Autopoiesis, Life, and Cognition: One and the Same?
In the original formulations (Maturana and Varela, 1980; Varela,
1997), the notions of autopoiesis, life, and cognition are charac-
terized by a marked coextension and interdependence of their
meanings. However, such equivalence—and in particular the
assimilation of cognition to autopoiesis—has been recently ques-
tioned. In the following, we briefly outline the arguments of two
of the main contributions to this debate [see Thompson (2007)
for a review].
Bourgine and Stewart (2004) illustrate their critique by devis-
ing a mathematical model of a closed dynamical system imple-
menting a virtual structure similar to a micelle 4. The reactions
occurring within its boundary satisfy the conditions for the sys-
tem to be called autopoietic: they continuously produce their
components and the boundary, which in turn encloses the reac-
tions. A single chemical A permeates the membrane and is the
substrate component of the main reaction of the system (A +
A → B), catalyzed by the components C of the boundary. As
components C decay on the boundary and are released in the
milieu as components D, holes are progressively formed on the
boundary’s surface. These holes are repaired by components B,
which are transformed into C components if they come in con-
tact with the edge of a hole. The automaton can either maintain
itself (if membrane holes are under a certain threshold, in terms
of number and size), or collapse (if this threshold is exceeded),
depending on the respective velocities of the two reactions of for-
mation and decay of the components of the boundary. However,
despite its autopoietic nature, no behavioral (motor) reaction is
produced by the virtual micelle in response to nutrients income
(interpreted as sensory data). The realization of a system with
autopoietic features but devoid of a fundamental sensorimotor
loop, which is deemed essential for cognition by the authors, leads
the latter to refute the equivalence of autopoiesis and cognition.
A similar conclusion is achieved by Bitbol and Luisi (2004),
who exemplify their point by considering a liposome, a vesicle-
shaped self-organizing chemical structure whose boundary is
made of a bilayer of lipidic molecules, called S (surfactant). The
aqueous environment of the liposome contains a highly lipophilic
precursor of S (called S-S) that is able to bind the vesicle’s bilayer
and, through an autocatalytic reaction of hydrolysis, integrate as
S-components into the boundary, thus enlarging its surface area.
After several hydrolysis reactions and integrations, the liposome
eventually divides into smaller vesicles (a variant of the same
experimental model characterized by homeostatic, rather than
self-reproducing autopoiesis has also been devised). Bitbol and
Luisi argue that while such amodel qualifies as autopoietic, it does
4Micelles are spheroidal organic structures, typically made of hydropho-
bic lipid molecules known as surfactants, capable of self-generation and
self-assembly.
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not exhibit (elementary) cognitive properties. For the authors, in
keeping with Maturana and Varela’s original view, the essence of
cognition lies in the continuously unfolding interactions between
the organism and the environment, whereby the former oper-
ates an active selection on the latter to ensure its own viability.
Crucially, this process can be recast in terms of the workings of
a living system’s metabolic network, which mediates the choice
of suitable metabolites from the environment and expels waste
catabolites in it, a metabolic network that is absent by design in
their example autopoietic system.
Both Bourgine and Stewart (2004) and Bitbol and Luisi (2004)
mention additional conditions for an autopoietic system to qual-
ify as a living one. Thompson (2007) suggests that the whole issue
may simply stem from a choice of terms: a narrower definition of
autopoiesis may not necessarily entail life and cognition, but if we
adopt a broader definition that requires the workings of a com-
plex metabolic self-organizing network, we could just consider
the examples from the authors above as proto- (or pre-) autopoi-
etic, rather than minimally-autopoietic, and leave the original
equation between autopoiesis, life and cognition, intact.
We have reviewed these points with the intent of providing a
context for our proposal and clarify its contribution. Quite inde-
pendently of the chosen definition of autopoiesis, we believe (a)
that the recognition of a fundamental similarity between mind
and life represents indeed a useful starting point for both the-
oretical speculations and empirical research, and (b) that such
similarity should be sought as far down the evolutionary lad-
der as an embodiment of the transcendental perspective can be
traced. From this point of view, the models proposed by the afore-
mentioned authors do not exhibit cognitive properties precisely
because they lack such embodiment, which impinges on the pres-
ence of a form enabling the organism to distinguish between
useful and irrelevant dimensions of the environment and is a nec-
essary prerequisite for the kind of mental act that in Section 1
we compared to “a fisherman casting his net out into the sea”. In
order for this intentionality—and the “surplus of significance” it
entails—to arise, concrete structures must be already in place that
select out features from the environment that are transcendentally
meaningful for the organism, relying on a sensorium whose very
existence descends from the iterated coupling (across multiple
time scales) of organism and environment.
Let us consider first Bourgine and Stewart’s autopoietic
automaton: in the virtual micelle, a few reactions take place
and produce some of their own components and those of the
boundary. For these reactions to occur, a chemical coming from
outside the boundary and permeating it is needed. In our per-
spective, such a system does not possess cognitive properties
because it does not feature any explicit, appropriately-shaped
organ 5 oriented to the detection of a specific chemical. More
precisely, the surface membrane of the autopoietic micelle has
no selective receptors or gates for the nutrients necessary for its
sustenance—receptors embodying the portions of the environ-
ment that subserve the system’s “natural purpose” of continued
existence (Weber and Varela, 2002) —and therefore does not
5We use the term “organ” here in the original sense of the greek word òrganon,
i.e., “instrument” or “means”.
entail any attempt to “get a grasp on” (a “com-prehension” of)
the environment. Likewise, Bitbol and Luisi’s model of minimal
autopoiesis also lacks the embodied transcendentality of a pri-
ori structures that would enable the vesicles to select appropriate
chemicals out of the environment and process them within an
internal metabolic network. The precursor S-S comes in contact
with the boundary of the vesicle only incidentally and reacts with
it by enlarging its surface, without any autonomous tendency of
the system to an openness to the external milieu.
The Diachronic and Synchronic Aspects of the Transcendental
Before examining a selection of scientific data under the theoret-
ical framework of embodied transcendentality, we would like to
point out that the search for embodied a priori structures that
enable cognition in an organism may be biased toward focusing
on a single time-slice selected out of a continuously-occurring
dialectical relationship between organism and environment.
While we believe that this is a useful procedure, it is impor-
tant to note that the transcendental process arguably operates
at multiple temporal scales. In particular, following Thompson
(2007)’s usage of concepts from developmental systems the-
ory (Oyama, 2000a,b), the behavior of ecologically-embedded
organisms can be seen as contributing to a modification of
the environment itself (through the creation of niches), which
can thus be considered part of the hereditary endowment of
the organism. Crucially, natural selection operates on the inte-
grated developmental system of organism plus environment and,
in this “diachronic” perspective, evolution can be seen as the
process of embodying in the organism the a priori structures
that mediate its viability. It is because of their emanation from
the coupling history of organism and environment that such
structures enable a formal “resonance” between the former and
the latter, which represents the “synchronic” aspect of tran-
scendentality underlying the creation of a meaningful world
for the organism. We anticipate that the distinction between
the synchronic and diachronic aspects of transcendentality is
echoed in virtually identical terms by the distinction between
the processes that give rise to perception and those that change
the architecture of the model of the world embodied by the
organism in terms of minimization of free-energy (Friston and
Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2010a) (see Section 3, “Free-energy for-
mulations”), and was also already present in Bitbol and Luisi
(2004).
Self-Organization and Teleology in Kant
Weber and Varela (2002) cogently noted that Kant’s Critique of
Judgment (1790) contains a strikingly prescient vision about a
self-organizational account of life. Therein, Kant claims that life
cannot be derived at all from the mechanical laws of Newtonian
physics, which only postulated “efficient causes” and not “end
causes”6: nature appears to act “as if” it had purposes, and in fact
6In our practical life, Kant explains, these two orders of causes are circularly
linked by the exclusive role of intelligence: a house I possess may be the effi-
cient cause of the money I gain from renting it, but the idea of that gain
represents in turn the end cause of the construction of the house in the first
place.
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the only satisfactory way to describe life involves adopting a teleo-
logical perspective. Furthermore, and here the anticipation of the
concept of autopoiesis is stunning indeed, Kant reasons that dif-
ferently from a human artifact (e.g., a watch), a living organism
is composed by parts that not only—as in artifacts—exist for the
purpose of making each other (and the whole artifact) function,
but also materially produce each other: “A thing exists as a natural
purpose if it is (though in a double sense) both cause and effect of
itself ” and also “such a product as an organized and self-organizing
being can be called a natural purpose” [Critique of Judgment, as
cited in Weber and Varela (2002)]. However, in the Critique of
Judgment, this is not regarded yet as a constitutive principle: it
does not say anything about how things are objectively, nor can
it be presented as a scientific claim. It is only deemed a regulative
principle, by which Kant means an orienting conceptual arrow to
guide further scientific research.
Weber and Varela (2002) explore this Kantian premonition
about the complexity of biology by showing how Kant’s agnos-
ticism about the legitimacy of teleology in scientific accounts of
life (i.e., his unstable position between teleology and teleonomy,
where the latter regards natural purposes simply as convenient
descriptions) may be resolved within the theoretical framework
of autopoiesis. The emerging identity and sense-making property
of autopoietic agents are presented by the authors as an expres-
sion of immanent teleology: in a living organism “all relations of
cause and effect are also relations of means and purpose” (Weber
and Varela, 2002) 7. A prefiguration of this idea, the authors
argue, can be found in Kant’s Opus Postumum (1804), where
the transcendental principle was already somehow embodied as a
consequence of Kant’s realization that nothing but the living body
can be the basis for the a priori categories he had postulated in the
Critique of Pure Reason.
Our proposal to consider the transcendental as a core princi-
ple in biology does in fact partially overlap with the arguments
in Weber and Varela (2002), but perhaps with a more specific
focus on the biological a priori structures as a constitutive fea-
ture of autopoiesis. This can be seen as a biologically-rooted
attempt to follow in the steps of the “Copernican revolution”
advocated by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he
argued that the properties that we can assign to the objects are
nothing but the very preconditions for knowing the objects them-
selves and, consequently, that we cannot know the objects per
se but only inasmuch as they fit our predetermined sensory
and intellective apparatus. In our opinion, while underscor-
ing the necessity of a priori structures for cognitive activity,
it is also important to remark that such structures represent
in fact a recapitulation of the successful coupling of organ-
ism and environment across multiple time scales (Maturana
and Varela, 1980) within the organism’s “flesh”. This perspec-
tive, we believe, may help establishing a more balanced base
for the creative pursue of mutual constraints (Varela, 1996)
or “generative passages” (Lutz, 2002) between first- and third-
person data originally advocated by the neurophenomenology
programme.
7See Nagel (2012), for a recent articulation of the legitimacy of the teleological
principle vis-à-vis the mechanistic paradigm.
The Transcendental in the Bacterium
As a first example of transcendental embodiment, we will focus
briefly on the bacterial process of chemotaxis that has been used
before to illustrate embodied cognition in its most elementary
form 8 (Varela et al., 1991; Varela, 1997; Thompson, 2007). As
reviewed by Wadhams and Armitage (2004), almost all bacte-
ria in which motility has been shown are chemotactic, i.e., their
movement is biased toward regions with high concentration of
nutrients or low concentration of toxic chemicals. In homoge-
neous environments, bacteria change direction very frequently,
producing random movement. If nutritive or toxic chemicals
are present in the environment, bacteria like Escherichia Coli
change the pattern of motion of their flagella so as to bias their
direction. Flagella are the most complex structure in bacterial
anatomy, capable of two types of rotation. Clockwise rotation of
flagella leads to tumbling, a continuous random change of direc-
tion, while counter-clockwise rotation promotes swimming, i.e.,
motion along a steady course. The switch from one modality to
the other is possible thanks to the action of several metabolic
networks, including events of protein phosphorilation leading to
DNA transcription, which originate at the surface membrane.
The membrane contains different chemoreceptors that, being
rigidly set both anatomically and genetically before the new-
born cell encounters any chemical attractor or repellant, formally
predetermine the sensing. We can notice here a minimal tran-
scendental relationship with the environment, expressed by a
non-representational form of cognition, that impinges on formal
structures synchronically definable as a priori: it is the presence of
such structures that shapes the very limits of the organism’s world
and effectively defines its “cognitive domain.”
While chemotaxis is arguably the most intuitive and evident
form of embodiment of the transcendental paradigm in the bac-
terial world, the same interpretative perspective could be applied
to other features of bacterial biology, particularly to interindi-
vidual processes. Let us take plasmid horizontal transfer through
bacterial conjugation (Willetts and Wilkins, 1984) as an exam-
ple. A plasmid (Lederberg, 1952) is an extrachromosomal DNA
molecule present in the bacterial cytoplasm in defined copy num-
bers and capable of autonomous replication. The phenotypic
characters encoded by plasmids are not usually necessary for
cell survival since their products are only seldom useful pro-
teins, such as enzymes responsible for drug resistance, toxins, and
molecules acting as iron-carriers known as syderophores (Crosa,
1989). Notably, the copies of a plasmid can be transferred not only
to daughter cells during bacterial fission, but also between cells,
thanks to the production of cytoplasmic hair-like connections
(conjugative pili), within a process known as bacterial conjuga-
tion (Bradley, 1981); conjugative pili are in turn encoded by genes
localized on special plasmids, called conjugative plasmids. From
our perspective, this process is useful in illustrating a fundamen-
tal feature of transcendentality, namely its multi-layered nature.
More specifically, in this case, the a priori structures represented
by the plasmids can bridge the inter-individual gap to become
invariants at the population level, thus providing the horizon for
8The use of bacteria to exemplify the concept of autopoiesis is also particularly
fitting given that the overwhelming majority of biomass on Earth is bacterial.
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a “social” cognitive domain. In the immune function and in the
nervous system, as will be shown, this aspect becomes even more
evident.
The Transcendental in the Immune Function
Kant thought that science (Newtonian physics, in particular)
was based on what he called a priori synthetic judgments, i.e.,
statements where the a priori mathematical element shapes an a
posteriori experienced content (e.g., “all matter is quantitatively
conserved”). The mystery of how nature accepts such an apri-
oristic constraint is the trigger for all of Kant’s aforementioned
speculations. Some intriguing parallels with these concepts can
be drawn in the study of immune function. A crucial component
of our immune defence from pathogens is mediated by proteins
known as immunoglobulins (Ig) or antibodies. An Ig is formed
by four polypeptidic chains bound together in a Y-shaped struc-
ture that can be found either embedded in the surface membrane
of a specific type of lymphocytes, the B cells, or free in biologi-
cal liquids (Edelman, 1991). The extremity of every chain in the
upper part of the Y contains a region (paratope) specialized for the
recognition of a complementary aminoacidic pattern (epitope)
present in the exogenous protein (antigen) to be neutralized. B
cells expressing surface self-reactive Igs, i.e., recognizing epitopes
belonging to the organism they are meant to defend, are normally
eliminated thanks to special mechanisms. These processes lead to
the survival of only B cells that are able to distinguish “self” from
“non-self” structures (Cornall et al., 1995).
As in the bacterium’s case, structural analogues of the Kantian
a priori determination of experience can be sought at multi-
ple scales. From a general point of view, two aspects should
be highlighted. First, the antigen-antibody complex can be seen
as a biological analog of an a priori synthetic judgment, for it
comprises an a priori formal component (the paratope, which
already embodies in a key-lock fashion the epitope’s shape that
it may encounter), and an a posteriori content (the portion of
the world that is singled out as an epitope); notably, the variabil-
ity spectrum of all paratopes is almost completely predetermined
by complex mechanisms of DNA recombination (Hozumi and
Tonegawa, 1976). Second, such transcendental dynamics entails
the emergence of a form of self or identity.
Transcendentality could also be seen at work in other
immunologic phenomena. For instance, the process leading to
the amplification of an antigen-specific B cell population occur-
ring after the initial epitope recognition (in order to produce
a sufficient quantity of Igs to block an infection) follows the
same rules. This mechanism takes place thanks to signaling inter-
actions between B and T cells, mediated by small molecules
called cytokines (Lanzavecchia, 1990). Once a B cell recognizes a
pathogen through the aforementioned paratope-epitope comple-
mentation, the whole antigen is internalized by the cell, degra-
dated into peptides, hence complexed with specific membrane
proteins, and finally presented to T cells, within the process of
T cell activation. T cells, recognizing these very peptides through
a receptor, produce cytokines and direct them only toward the B
cells by which they have been activated. As a result, B cells both
proliferate and produce more Igs against that specific pathogen
(Parker, 1993). From the interpretative perspective proposed in
this paper, multilayered and multifaceted transcendental interac-
tions can be discerned within this process: the epitope confor-
mation recognized by the Ig on the B cell membrane and the
aminoacidic sequence of the peptide recognized by the T cell
receptor are structurally very different, with hardly anything in
their steric conformation leading back to the same pathogen.
However, their linkage is achieved by means of what can be seen
as a complex transcendental apparatus that goes beyond the mere
a priori determined shapes of antibodies and manifests itself in
the whole interaction between B and T cells, including Igs, T cell
receptors and cytokines. This represents a hierarchically higher,
but still fully embodied, instance of immunologic transcendental-
ity. The multilayered nature of the transcendental will be further
explored within the nervous system in the following section.
3. TRANSCENDENTAL NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY
The original, pragmatical aim of neurophenomenology was to
establish a disciplined approach to first-person experience that
would enable a mutual enlightenment of phenomenology and
neuroscience by reciprocal constraints (Varela, 1996). We believe
that the theoretical aspect of the neurophenomenology pro-
gramme could benefit from a stronger emphasis on the tran-
scendental properties of the brain as a biological, autopoietic
system. In the following subsections, we provide concrete exam-
ples of such an interpretation, while in a subsequent section we
will show how a transcendental perspective may help to shed
light onto the potential usefulness of contemplative practices for
neurophenomenology.
Action-Oriented Perception in the Mirror System as a Transcendental
Mechanism
Let us begin by considering transcendentality in the context of
sensory experience, that is, as the relationship between the a
priori form within which subjective experience arises and the a
posteriori content of that experience (e.g., the perceptual cate-
gory of a human face vs. the percept of a specific face). At a
first stage of approximation, when low-level sensory information
from primary cortices in the brain impact on higher-level associa-
tive cortices, the latter can be seen as embodying a priori (albeit
malleable) structures that are necessary for meaning to arise a
posteriori when matching up with suitable input9. Since our aim
here is not to provide an exhaustive review of all cortical pro-
cesses amenable to be viewed under a transcendental perspective,
we will limit our reflection to a few specific networks, beginning
with the so-called “mirror neurons” within the premotor cortex
of the primate [see Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) for a review].
The importance of the sensorimotor system in cognition is
exemplified by the notion of “affordance” (Gibson, 1979), a term
indicating a pragmatic opportunity for motor interaction pre-
sented by an object to the subject, which cognitively qualifies
the former in terms of the behavior it “affords.” The relevance
of such implicit motor components for the perception of an
9The approximation here concerns the fact that there is likely a transcenden-
tal component in the lower-level neuronal circuits as well. The transcendental
mechanism may in fact be at work down to the minimal levels of neural
assemblies exhibiting self-organizing properties.
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object, regardless of the actual explicitation of movement, has
been greatly enriched by the later discovery of “mirror” prop-
erties of specific neuronal populations, originally identified in
the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the macaque mon-
key (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti
et al., 1996). Neurophysiological recordings from this area showed
neurons discharging both when monkeys performed a specific
motion andwhen they saw anothermonkey or operator executing
the same action. Similar properties have been reported for neu-
rons in various human cortical areas, notably in fronto-parietal
circuits, which have been proposed to encode the very goal of
the action (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010)10. In the mirror neu-
ron theory, this coding represents a parsimonious mechanism
for the direct understanding (i.e., without the need of inferen-
tial reasoning) of motor goals and, through a larger-scale process
of integration, of the intentions of others, thus playing a cru-
cial role in social cognition. Studies in the monkey (Sakata et al.,
1995) also showed that specific neurons within the anterior intra-
parietal area (AIP), which has strong reciprocal connections to
area F5, respond both to object grasping by the animal itself (in
light as well as in darkness) and to object observation alone, sup-
porting a Gibsonian view of perception. Although this type of
response is not often reported in studies on humans, a similar
phenomenon has been observed within putative human analogs
of mirror areas such as the ventral premotor cortex (vPM) and
intraparietal lobule (IPL): following a training where geometrical
shapes were associated to hand actions, vPM and IPL showed an
adaptated response from shape observation to both hand action
execution and observation, additionally suggesting that mirror
properties may arise as the result of simple sensorimotor coupling
throughout life (Press et al., 2012).
In order to underscore the transcendental principle within
the mirror system function, it is useful to draw a comparison
with the previous example from immunology. In the former case,
the Ig possesses a priori the specific morphological features cor-
responding to the antigen to be neutralized; in the latter case,
motor patterns that predetermine and select specific features of
the object (e.g., the shape of a mug handle) represent necessary
a priori forms for its meaningful perception. Both can be seen as
instances of embodiment of the transcendental, as we have thus
far discussed.
Core and Historical Sense of Self: Transcendentality and the
Default-Mode Network
Considering that experience may not necessarily concern a con-
tingent external stimulus, but also a fully-endogenous product of
mentation (e.g., the recall of episodic memories or the envision-
ing of future scenarios), leads us to examine the question of the
self. The transcendental here appears to be at work in at least two
fundamental configurations. First, as a form of prereflective self-
consciousness accompanying the experience of not only external
objects (Zahavi, 2002), but also of mentally-evoked scenarios, and
10This encoding is realized across different scales, from neurons specific for
one single observed and executed act, to others specific for a broader goal
achievable by different motor strategies.
giving it a core sense of “mineness”. Second, as the historically-
determinedmental content from previous experiences now acting
as an a priori for the interpretation of novel suitable stimuli.
Notably, both layers of the transcendental are operating in the
course of everyday experience (although this may not be the case
for altered states of consciousness and in contemplative practices).
The intrinsic circularity that can be noticed in the above descrip-
tion, where perception is determined by structures that are in turn
shaped by the active coupling of subject and environment over
time, is in fact a telling sign of the enactive nature of both mind
and body. This feature can be illustrated more clearly by examin-
ing the relationship between ongoing and evoked neural activity
in the brain.
Already early in the history of human brain imaging it was
noted that frontal cortical regions display an elevated blood
flow during passive but wakeful rest (Ingvar, 1979). A later
meta-analysis (Shulman et al., 1997) and a further investigation
by Raichle et al. (2001) established that there is a consistent
set of brain regions that show high metabolic activity at rest
and decrease their activity during demanding externally-oriented
tasks (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Gusnard et al., 2001). This
set of regions, that came to be known as the “default-mode
network” (DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001), includes the medial pre-
frontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex
(PCC/Rsp), the lateral inferior parietal lobe (IPL), and the hip-
pocampal formation/parahippocampal gyrus (HF/pHipp) in the
medial temporal lobe. While the different regions of the DMN
have been traditionally associated with specific functions—e.g.,
the medial temporal lobe subsystem, together with PCC/Rsp, is
implicated in successful retrieval of detailed information from
memory (Vincent et al., 2006); the MPFC subsystem is typi-
cally engaged by self-referential judgment tasks (Gusnard et al.,
2001; Qin and Northoff, 2011)—the functional and adaptive
significance of the DMN as a whole remains elusive.
As several works reviewed in Buckner et al. (2008) show, one
functional hypothesis is that the DMN underpins spontaneous
mentation in the form of stimulus-independent thoughts (SITs),
that is, thoughts detached from the contingencies of the present
environment or task. The number of SITs increases during rest-
ing state compared to during demanding tasks, and indeed the
activity of the DMN has been repeatedly associated with this kind
of mind-wandering (Binder et al., 1999; McKiernan et al., 2003,
2006; Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood et al.,
2012). The activity of the DMN has also been linked to acts of
“self-projection,” a general mental faculty that includes recall of
autobiographical memories, theory of mind (i.e., inferring the
mental content and intentions of others), future envisioning, and
moral decision making (Buckner et al., 2008). All of these phe-
nomenal correlates of the DMN share two fundamental features.
First, they all entail representations of scenarios that are always
alternative to the experience of the actual contingent environ-
ment; not surprisingly, some authors have proposed an adaptive
explanation for this mental activity (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007) as
a sort of “life simulator” for the exploration and anticipation of
events and social circumstances (Buckner et al., 2008). The other
feature shared by the majority of DMN-related mental processes
is that the imagined perspectives are self-referenced, i.e., they are
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centered on the subject’s self; DMN regions have in fact been
shown to increase their activity when envisioning future scenarios
that included the subject herself (Szpunar et al., 2007).
These experimental findings enable us to speculate that,
although the activation (or the ongoing activity) of the DMN is
correlatively linked to specific mental contents, it is also generally
related to the sense of self. This sense of self is to be consid-
ered both as the empirical, historically-determined “I”—i.e., the
one based on specific behavioral traits, interests, education and
so forth—and, in a more basic sense, as the invariant character
shared by all these experiential contents (as well as those elicited
by external sensory stimulation), namely the noetic act of intend-
ing toward the contents themselves. Here lies in fact one of the
central aims of our proposal for neurophenomenology: to iden-
tify and illuminate via the transcendental perspective the neural
processes that give rise to the complexity of the noetic-noematic
relationship and structure, rather than approaching the noematic
or the noetic aspects separately. An important discussion of these
themes can indeed be found already in Lutz (2002): the present
work can be seen as extending the arguments discussed therein,
with the same goal of facilitating the production of “generative
passages” between first-person accounts and biological descrip-
tions, by placing a more explicit emphasis on the transcendental
structure of brain function and organization.
The role of the DMN in framing mental content within the
autobiographical self
The extant data implicating the DMN in memory processes (both
voluntary and spontaneous), suggests that it may embody a set
of autobiographical a priori categories according to which novel
mental content is apperceived and take on its peculiar and sub-
jective meaning. As recently shown (Qin and Northoff, 2011),
cortical midline structures of the DMN, in particular MPFC and
PCC/Rsp, are involved in processing self-related (as compared to
non self-related) stimuli (e.g., an image of a piano perceived by
a pianist). While Northoff (2012) noticed indeed that the neu-
ral overlap between stimulus-dependent and resting state activity
has an intriguing similarity with Kantian views of knowledge,
our position is differently articulated. First, he seems to con-
sider the historical/autobiographical sense of self as the ultimate
a priori structure to which extrinsic stimuli should conform in
order to become conscious; we find this view important but not
exhaustive, within the search for the neural structure of embodied
transcendentality, as will be argued in the forthcoming para-
graphs. Second, Northoff ’s reference to Kant’s legacy is treated as
a heuristic to guide neuroscience, and is not really framed within
an autopoietic perspective.
A putative role of the DMN in providing the prereflective horizon for
mental content
The DMN activity has also been examined in relation to stim-
uli that are not explicitly related to the self. In fact, some authors
have linked the elevated activity of the DMN at rest to a broad,
spontaneous mode of information-harvesting in the absence of
top-down focused attention (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Gilbert
et al., 2007; Hahn et al., 2007). This functional interpretation,
known as the “sentinel hypothesis” (Buckner et al., 2008), is
consistent with a role of the DMN in realizing a first-person
viewpoint on the world that frames and anchors all contingent
percepts to the subject’s identity. Notably, while the ventral por-
tion of the PCC/Rsp node of the DMN is more involved in
the retrieval and encoding of episodic memory, the more dor-
sal aspect is especially implicated in spatial navigation and in
orienting the body in space (Vogt et al., 2006), providing a “situat-
edness” that may arguably be part of the “horizon” of prereflective
consciousness within whose bounds mental content is staged.
Prereflective bodily-awareness outside of the DMN
For the sake of completeness, we should point out that prere-
flective self-awareness includes a sheer bodily component with
affective valence (Damasio, 1999; Thompson and Varela, 2001;
Legrand, 2006), whose transcendental structures may be phy-
logenetically very ancient (and thus more rigidly determined)
and engendered by the activity of insular cortices specialized for
interoception (Craig, 2002, 2009, 2011). Notably, insula and ante-
rior cingulate, which often activate in concert, have been viewed
as limbic analogs of sensory and motor cortices, respectively
(Heimer and Hoesen, 2006; Craig, 2009), an interpretation that
would fit nicely with a role of these regions in providing a bodily
component of the sense of self related to homeostatic and basic
sensorimotor loops; see Seth et al. (2011) for a recent formulation
of this hypothesis in a predictive-coding framework. In a more
speculative fashion, we would also like to briefly comment on
how the phenomenology of the phantom limb following amputa-
tion (Ramachandran, 1998; Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998)
suggests that innate somatic a priori may be particularly resis-
tant to change, a notion consistent with recent findings on its
cortical correlates (Makin et al., 2013). Similarly, phantom limb
pain may reflect the autopoietic attempt at survival of the neural
a priori for limb perception, in spite of missing visual and somes-
thesic input, by creating an emergent nociceptive pattern that
sustains the activity of the a priori itself via downward causation
(Thompson and Varela, 2001).
The Transcendental Rhythm of Ongoing Brain Activity
In order to avoid potential misunderstandings, we would like
to make clear that we are not claiming that the neural processes
underpinning prereflective self-awareness exist qua a specific
activation pattern within a single network. The entire brain is
likely not to be sufficient, in fact, for this self-awareness, which
may critically depend on the presence of a body (Thompson
and Varela, 2001). Furthermore, since the a priori structures in
the body and the brain are generated and shaped (both phylo-
and onto-genetically) by an interaction with the environment, to
limit cognition to what takes place within the cranial vault seems
specious. However, the brain’s contribution is crucial: its complex
hierarchy of neural patterns is indispensable to orchestrate the
rhythm of the transcendental process, where the intentional
casting out of prereflective assumptions is followed immediately
by the arising of a mental content. Such hierarchy is declined in
both a spatial and a temporal dimension, as several empirical
data suggest. Sadaghiani et al. (2010) review these issues arguing
against a strictly segregationist view of spatial and temporal brain
dynamics, i.e., interpretations of single areas or single frequencies
as exclusive for certain processes. On the spatial side, networks
spanning a large range of scales can be identified by functional
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connectivity methods, depending on how much shared temporal
variance among the components of a network we decide is nec-
essary to identify it as such. A similarly nested structure can be
observed also at the temporal level, where intrinsic brain activity
appears to be characterized by a 1/f spectral distribution with a
predominance of very slow frequencies (Leopold et al., 2003; Nir
et al., 2008). This complex-system dynamics should be studied by
neurophenomenology in the light of the neural account for time
consciousness proposed by Varela (1999). According to Varela’s
hypothesis, the diffuse structure of the “living present,” with a
“pure present” at the center and a larger horizon encompassing
the memory of what has just passed as well as an anticipation
of the immediate future, reflects a hierarchy of neural dynamics
unfolding at multiple temporal scales. In this context, phase
synchrony of neural discharge is hypothesized to occur at the
most basic level within the smallest sensorimotor assemblies
(reflecting the “pure present”), which are in turn recruited by
larger assemblies that integrate the activity of the components
in a globally coherent fashion: this latter level would represent
the uncompressible phenomenological granularity giving rise
to the “living present” that we actually perceive. Regardless of
whether this specific model is correct, it is not unreasonable to
speculate that the rhythm of consciousness may directly reflect
the various inertial phases in the process of transcendental
recruitment of previously stored contents of experience, thus
enabled as categories, for the interpretation of the present input
flow. For example, it has been shown that during a decision task
on Rubin’s ambiguous vase-face figures, the ongoing prestimulus
activity in the right fusiform face area—a region specialized for
face processing—biased subjects toward the detection of a face
rather than a vase (Hesselmann et al., 2008a). This finding, which
has been also replicated in the domain of motion perception
(Hesselmann et al., 2008b), is in agreement with the idea of a
noetic self-casting of consciousness (“throwing the net out into
the sea”) that we have been discussing so far.
Free-Energy Formulations
This philosophical analysis of brain processes might benefit from
a formalization of the transcendental relationship as the struc-
tural invariant across experience and brain processes, a feature the
neurophenomenological method cannot overlook (Thompson,
2007, p. 329). In this regard, a recently proposed formulation of
brain dynamics in terms of free-energy by Karl Friston appears
to be especially promising (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston,
2009, 2010a). The free-energy principle, which builds on the early
ideas of HermannHelmholtz on perceptual processing, states that
a self-organizing (autopoietic) system, in order to maintain its
form and function, behaves as to minimize surprise11. The brain
is viewed as an inferential machine following Bayesian principles
that continuously brings forth predictions about the causes of
sensory input and elicits actions that seek to confirm them. To this
aim, the parameters specifying the internal model generating such
11Surprise is formally defined as the improbability of sampled sensory data
under a generative model of the agent’s world. The fact that surprise is condi-
tional on a model is essential to explain explorative behavior and thus to avoid
the “dark-room” paradox (Friston et al., 2012).
predictions are constantly updated, thus explaining away a predic-
tion error resulting from the discrepancy between predicted and
actual input—a measure that under certain simplifying assump-
tions coincides with free energy. This scheme is embodied in a
complex cortical hierarchy where higher level assemblies compute
prediction errors and issue modification signals to the generative
model, implemented at a lower level. Minimization of free-energy
occurs in the brain via adjustment of three neural aspects: (i)
synaptic activity, during the process of perception, (ii) synaptic
gain (precision), accounting for the modulatory effect of atten-
tion on perception, and (iii) synaptic efficacy, implementing
learning processes (that is, updating the model) based on expe-
rience. The free-energy principle can be seen as a dynamic system
theory-based formulation of the transcendental (here fashioned
in terms of Bayesian priors) as applied to brain function, a frame-
work that we believe avoids the major pitfalls of classical reduc-
tionism and has a great potential to inspire further progress in
neurophenomenology. We think this is the case because the the-
ory, while allowing a rigorous mathematical formalization, is also
sufficiently embodied to be consistent, on the one hand, with a
sensorimotor-centered view of cognition and, on the other hand,
with an account that sees the phenomenological transcendental
as impinging on the biological one. In fact, the free-energy frame-
work seems able to reconcile for the first time the German roman-
tic Naturephilosophie and the physicalist program of Helmoltz,
two divergent offsprings of Kant’s original ambivalence about
teleology (Weber and Varela, 2002); within this perspective, Kant’s
notion of the natural purpose of an organism, i.e., its tendency
to conserve form and function, is recast as its incessant suppres-
sion of free-energy. Notably, the free-energy principle can apply
to longer time scales as well, providing a cogent description of co-
evolutionary processes that embed/embody salient features of the
environment within an organism and that thus govern the forma-
tion of the a priori structures along the phylogenesis axis (Friston,
2010b; Friston et al., 2012).
Neurophenomenology in Clinical Conditions
Finally, we would like to examine two clinical conditions—spatial
unilateral neglect and schizophrenia—that, in our opinion, show
the practical advantages of neurophenomenological studies con-
ducted under the transcendental perspective. Unilateral spatial
neglect is a neurological condition secondary to vascular or trau-
matic incidents. It is characterized by the inability to attend to
and report stimuli on the side (often left) opposite to the lesion
despite apparently normal vision, by an action bias toward the
non-neglected hemifield, as well as by various disorders of aware-
ness, including a denial of illness (anosognosia). The pathogenesis
of neglect remains unclear despite recent promising proposals
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2011). Commonly injured regions in
neglect are the parietal cortex (especially IPL), the superior tem-
poral gyrus (STG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Husain and
Kennard, 1996; Karnath et al., 2001; Mort et al., 2003), as well
as subcortical structures (Karnath et al., 2002; Bartolomeo et al.,
2007). A recent account of neglect implicates altered connections
within the right hemisphere between a dorsal fronto-parietal
attention network, involved in top-down spatial attention but sel-
dom injured in patients, and a ventral fronto-parietal attention
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network whose lesions have been frequently associated with non-
spatial aspects of neglect (Corbetta and Shulman, 2011); this
disruption of normal connectivity would in turn be responsible
for altering the interhemispheric balance in the activity of the dor-
sal network, during both rest and task. In the light of the previous
discussion about ongoing activity and its interpretation as a reper-
toire of priors cast out toward the world, we find this condition to
be of particular interest. From a phenomenological point of view,
the pathology can be interpreted as arising from an impairment
of the noetic part of the transcendental movement, i.e., a failure
of the basic a priori categories without which no perception can
occur: visual input, albeit intact, remains an almost useless datum
when the a priori it should conform to is not active anymore. We
feel that such a transcendental reading of ongoing activity is not a
merely speculative exercise, but could actually open up a promis-
ing avenue of research for neglect and other agnosic-like diseases.
Our second example where transcendental neurophe-
nomenology could provide a useful interpretative framework is
schizophrenia, a mental illness characterized by a dramatically
altered perception of reality. So-called “positive” symptoms
include auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions and disorga-
nized speech, while “negative” symptoms comprise affective flat-
tening, memory and attention impairment. Preliminary data sug-
gesting an overactive DMN in schizophrenia have recently been
reported (Garrity et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; Zhou et al.,
2007), on the basis of the typically blurred boundary between
inner mentalized scenarios and stimuli from the external envi-
ronment, as well as between self and other (Buckner et al., 2008).
In this case, we think that a transcendental neurophenomenology
along the lines discussed so far could provide a neuroscientific
counterpart to the phenomenological speculative research on
psychiatric illness. With regard to the latter, it is worthwhile to
mention Sass and Parnas (2003)’s interpretation of schizophrenia
usingHusserlian notions, where symptoms are explained as deriv-
ing from a disturbance of ipseity, explicitly defined as “myness”
or prereflective self-awareness. Once again, the hypothesized
link between ongoing DMN activity and prereflective self-
awareness can represent a fertile ground of mutual enrichment
for neuroscience and transcendental phenomenology.
4. CONTEMPLATIVE PRACTICES AND
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY
Contemplative practices as found within the Buddhist and other
traditions share with phenomenology a specific attention to the
first-person examination of mental function in a disciplined
fashion. In fact, it has been previously suggested that neurophe-
nomenology could benefit from a closer familiarity with such
practices (Varela et al., 1991; Varela, 1996), and we believe this
suggestion is even more appropriate in the light of the issues
discussed so far.
To this aim, we propose to look afresh at the process of med-
itation under the guiding notions of transcendentality and of
predictive coding in the free-energy framework. A shared char-
acteristic of many contemplative practices is the prescription to
maintain a steady posture and minimize the variability of sen-
sory input, e.g., by avoiding to change the direction of the gaze
and by choosing a silent place for sitting. These instructions cor-
respond in fact to subtracting out the adjusting manouvre of
motor action and perception from the self-confirmatory loop of
the transcendental process, a gesture for which we hypothesize
a few important consequences: (a) the constant tension toward
seeking self-confirmation in the outside world gradually abates,
(b) the transcendental manifold may now begin to engage with
itself instead of with external stimuli, providing partial insight
into its structure to the meditator, and (c) minimization of free-
energy when external stimulation is greatly reduced but attention
is kept alert may prune the discrepancies among different compo-
nents of the internal model, resulting in an increased consistency
of the cognitive structure of the meditator, which may be at the
basis of the sensation of being more “unified” often reported by
contemplative practitioners. In other words, the cognitive activ-
ity about the world that is generated in performing adjustments
to the internal probabilistic model on the basis of sensory data
during everyday life, becomes cognitive activity about the self 12, a
perspective that affords some intriguing speculations.
First, if the core sense of an “I” exists only insofar as it keeps
maximizing the evidence supporting it (by issuing appropriate
actions that minimize free-energy), this incessant transcendental
process at the root of cognitive activity can be also likened to a pri-
mary existential “suffering,” a lingering and mostly subconscious
anxiety that such confirmation may one day fail. It is not difficult
here to see the analogy with the Buddhist idea of a fundamen-
tal “craving”13 lying at the heart of human suffering (duh. kha, in
Sanskrit), and with the related notion of impermanence (anitya,
in Sanskrit) (Mizuno, 1996). Within the soteriological prospect
of Buddhism, contemplative practices provide a privileged access
to this state of affairs and, most fittingly with our interpreta-
tive framework, are said to be conducive to a reduction of the
“mineness” or ego-centered quality of experience (Austin, 1998,
2009). More tangentially, a fascinating correspondence could be
drawn between the notion that cognitive activity is inescapably
endowed with a self-confirmatory nature, and the expounding
of the Buddhist doctrine in Do¯gen Zenji (1200–1253 CE), the
founder of the So¯to school of Zen in Japan, centered on the idea
that “delusion” and “enlightenment” are “ever intimate” and thus
cannot in any way be considered separately (Kim, 2007).
Second, it is generally thought in contemplative traditions that
sustained practice foster the capability of realizing the construc-
tive and provisional quality of our conceptual structure, which
in turn may lead to a greater freedom of choice for behavior
and enhanced creativity—claims that have found some sup-
porting evidence from recent psychological and neuroimaging
research on semantic processing, mental flexibility, and creativity
(Pagnoni et al., 2008; Moore andMalinowski, 2009; Colzato et al.,
2012; Greenberg et al., 2012; Ostafin and Kassman, 2012). The
allegedly privileged stance afforded by meditation to observe the
transcendental process at work may be especially valuable for the
neurophenomenological enterprise, in that it may provide spe-
cific hints for the investigation of neural processes embodying
different instances and layers of the cognitive a priori endowment.
This may be especially fruitful for what concerns the function
12Cognitive activity is intended here in its more general, autopoietic accep-
tion, which includes processes occurring below the level of consciousness.
13Where craving can be construed as the emotion-laden, intentional aspect of
self-confirmation.
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of the DMN in enacting and looking out for environmental
confirmation of a model of the self based on autobiographical
memories 14; a number of changes in the dynamics and struc-
ture of the DMN associated with meditative practices have in fact
recently been reported (Pagnoni et al., 2008; Brewer et al., 2011;
Taylor et al., 2011; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Josipovic et al., 2012;
Pagnoni, 2012; Taylor et al., 2013), although the phenomenologi-
cal aspects of experimental design in this field have yet to be fully
explored [but see Garrison et al. (2013a,b) for pioneering steps in
this direction].
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have underlined the importance of Kant’s and
Husserl’s legacies as methodological resources for better charac-
terizing the reading of the living world in terms of a transcen-
dental relationship. To this aim, we first compared proto-living
or minimal autopoietic systems to bacteria in order to analyze
elementary biological analogs of the subject’s a priori knowing
apparatus. We then focused on the immune function for an
illustration of the processes of transcendentality and identity-
emergence in a system of greater complexity. We finally examined
some neuroscientific data and clinical conditions under a tran-
scendental perspective, concluding with a section on the relevance
of contemplative practices for neurophenomenology.
Our main message is that a transcendental reading of brain
activity can provide a useful framework where neurophe-
nomenology may better unfold its potential. Outside from
an autopoietic and enactive conception of biology, neurophe-
nomenology loses its peculiarity, namely that of a method that
conjugates organically and not by mere juxtaposition the deep
analogs between mind and life. However, while in extant the-
oretical accounts (Cosmelli et al., 2007; Thompson, 2007) it is
widely assumed that the brain as viewed by neurophenomenol-
ogy is a complex self-organizing system, and important experi-
mental work bridging neurodynamical patterns and first-person
accounts has already been carried out (Lutz et al., 2002; Cosmelli
et al., 2004), our feeling is that what we see as the very core of this
self-organization, namely, the presence of biologically-steeped a
priori structures, has often not been sufficiently underscored (but
see Weber and Varela (2002) for a notable exception). What we
hope to have provided in this paper is a suggestion about what, in
our opinion, is the crucial feature that any neurophenomenology-
inspired dynamic model of the brain should be centered upon,
i.e., a formalization of the structure/content or noetic/noematic
relationship. Such relationship, originally noticed and investi-
gated by philosophers with regard to subjective experience, can
be seen as embodied at multiple levels of life evolution. The brain
has a peculiar status in this picture, given the unique complexity
of its hierarchical architecture that makes it capable of embodying
a very large repertoire of possible interactions, not only between
organism and environment, but among different subcomponents
of its own structure as well. Therefore, while also bacteria and the
immune systems can be viewed as endowed with an elementary
14The putative role of the DMN in bringing forth autobiographical a priori
categories that affect experience echoes suggestively the Buddhist notion of
karma, indicating “seeds” of past action that bound the possibilities of current
behavior.
form of cognitive activity, every organism with a sufficiently large
brain produces a world that is infinitely richer in meaning.
Some of the neurodynamic models reviewed by Cosmelli et al.
(2007) as potentially useful for neurophenomenology include
indeed a formalization of this kind, e.g., of the relationship
between content and context of a given experience in terms of a
structured temporal binding of thalamo-cortical activity (Llinás
and Ribary, 2001), or of the subjective feeling of “expectancy”
preceding novel sensory stimulation on the basis of previous
experience (protention, in phenomenological parlance) in terms
of a dynamical linkage between the activities of enthorinal cor-
tex/hippocampus and sensory areas (Freeman, 2000). These,
however, can be seen as particular instances of one fundamental
principle shaping life and brain function, i.e., the transcenden-
tal, which in our opinion has not yet been granted a sufficient
importance in neurophenomenology.
A critical issue with the neurophenomenological search for a
correlation between “structural invariants” of experience [e.g.,
the temporal character of the transition from one quality of expe-
rience to another; see Cosmelli et al. (2004)] and brain dynamics,
is that formal models “can only capture the structure of a domain;
they cannot capture its intrinsic nature” (Bayne, 2004). But what
is consciousness’s intrinsic nature? It is subjectivity, a sense of
“prereflective and preconceptual ‘ipseity’ ” (Cosmelli et al., 2007):
in other words, transcendentality. The term transcendental is
here used in its pure Husserlian notion, indicating the pre-given
horizon within whose limits the subjective world discloses. Our
proposal consists mainly in broadening this notion to express the
fundamental character of life. Such generalization of the transcen-
dental, similar to that of cognition in the autopoiesis framework
(Varela et al., 1991), does not only extend its meaning outside
the domain of phenomenology i.e., to biology) but also within
it, emphasizing a hierarchical recapitulation of the transcendental
process at various levels of complexity. Thus, the transcenden-
tal comes to signify any subject/object (intentional) relationship
where the experience of the object is determined a priori by the
formal structures of the subject, in a Kantian spirit. When this
perspective is applied to neuroscience, it may aid the understand-
ing of, e.g., autobiographical memory traces as a priori categories
imbuing with meaning external stimuli relevant to the self, or
neural patterns of premotor activity as a priori forms for the per-
ception of “actionable” objects and situations. Once again, we
would like to stress that the transcendental should be understood
as multilayered and multifaceted, both on the neural and on the
phenomenological side.
If we consider the body (and the brain) not only as “tran-
scendentally lived” (Thompson, 2004) but also as transcen-
dentally organized, it may be easier to capture in a formal
model life’s and phenomenology’s common intrinsic nature.
Notably, Thompson and Varela (2001)’s approach to the neu-
roscience of consciousness, notwithstanding its originality in
being the first direct attempt to a neurophenomenological enter-
prise and in introducing a synergetics-informed account of
the relationship between brain and mind, does not, in our
opinion, fully address the transcendental as the core aspect
of bodily processes underpinning consciousness. On the other
hand, other neurodynamic models of consciousness (Engel and
Singer, 2001; Engel et al., 2001; Llinás and Ribary, 2001),
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despite including specific aspects of embodied transcendentality,
attribute them to a peculiar organization of neural processes and
do not explicitly address them as radical features of life [but see
Freeman (2000), for a proposal that is somewhat closer in spirit
to ours].
How is such interpretation of neurophenomenology to be
implemented in a contemporary disciplined programme? This
is a matter for future research to investigate. We will only sug-
gest here that such inquiry should be rooted in the notion
that the transcendental process occurs at multiple levels, and
thus select the levels to focus on according to the study’s spe-
cific aim. At one end of the spectrum, neurophenomenology’s
goal of bridging the mind-body problem may be facilitated by
addressing transcendentality at its most basic level, that is, the
fundamental noetic act of prereflective awareness. Such attempt
may usefully investigate intrinsic, ongoing brain activity as an
autopoietic, prediction-casting process, that infuses meaning to
both the internal and the external world. To this end, regular-
ities in the relationship between phenomenological and neural
transcendental features should be established, possibly capitalis-
ing on the enhanced introspective skills of subjects acquainted
with contemplative practices. At a different level, neurophe-
nomenology may explore its practical applicability to the study
of neurological and psychiatric conditions (e.g., agnosia, neglect,
memory impairments, schizophrenia). In this context, a putative
disruption of the transcendental process, both in its phenomeno-
logical and neural aspects, should be investigated as a potential
avenue for novel therapy developments.
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